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7
SELF-DETERMINATION AND INDEPENDENCE
MOVEMENTS IN EUROPE
Jeannine Plamondon

INTRODUCTION

Traditio nally in E urope, the state has had ultimate authority. With the creation of the
E uropean Union, however, states have delegated some authority and binding decisio nn.1aking power to supranational institutio ns. This shift in the power structure has not only
led to the consolidatio n of control away from the state toward supranati onal institutio ns, but
has also led to the arguably unintended devoluti o n of control away £i·onl the state towa rd
regional gove rnments (Loughlin 141 ). The state's relinquishing of power to the E uropean
Union in many ways has served the interest of stateless nations l and independence seekinggro ups. This paper will examine the role that the European Union has played for stateless
nations and will show that the EU has granted these groups grea ter autonomy and
representati on. It will then go on to examine how the EU can better address the needs of
stateless nations based o n current trends and the desires of independence-seeking groups.
M ost states in E urope are no t natio n states; states are often composed of two or m ore
distinct nationalities,2 ye t in this organization of multiple natio nalities within one gove rning
unit, one nationality almost inevitably asserts itself upon the others and becom es the
d ominant culture of the country, relegJting the o thers to Ininori ty status Ooan i Marl 112).
Stateless nations see g reat promise in the European Unio n because the EU is in many
aspects a supranational institution that combines many languages, cultures, and nations under
on e conunon governance-structure. Many of the E U member states are small countries, yet
upon their accession to the Unio n , their voices and concerns becom e, at least in theory,
equal with those o flarge member states such as France, the United Kingdom , and Germany.
Thus stateless nations within m ember states see m embership in the E uropean Unio n as a
golden opportunity fo r increased representation and autonomy. If a natio n as small as Malta,
with but 400,000 citizens has the right to have its voice hea rd in the EU, then w hy n ot
Catalonia, with 7 million citizens?
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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE AND REGIONALISM

In this paper, I will examine stateless nations and their position in the European
Union through the lens of governance theory, as traditional International Relations (IR)
and comparative politics theories often fail to examine the effects that sub-state actors have
on the European Union and vice versa. The governance approach instead "draws on both
IR and comparative politics and considers the EU as neither a traditional international
organization nor as a domestic 'political system', but rather as a new and emerging system of
'governance without government'" (Pollack 36). Governance is defined as "self-organizing,
interorganizational networks" with four basic characteristics: "interdependence between
organizations, continuing interactions between network members, game-like interactions,
and a sign!ficallt a11lount of autonomy ./i"Ol11 the state" (Pollack 37 emphasis added).
Gary Marks is credited as being the founder of multi-level governance theory that
deals specifically with the efIects of the supranational institutions on sub-state actors as well
as on the traditional state. Marks argues against intergovernmentalist theorists such as
Moravcsik by positing that in the EU states are losing power to both the European
Commission at the supranational level as well as to the local and regional governments
within the states (Pollack 39). Marks claims "supranational and sub-national actors (a)re
chipping away at the traditional dominance and control of national governments" (Pollack
39). The manner in which these sub-state actors chip away at state centred dominance will
be examined below.
THE CONCEPT OF REGIONALISM

In their quest for increased representation and independence, many stateless nations
and regional actors in Europe promote the idea of regionalism or a 'Europe of the Regions'.
During the beginning ~tages of European integration, regionalism was interpreted as a
federal European government with regions and sub-national govermnents taking over lnany
of the functions of the traditional member states (Loughlin 150). In 1963 French federalist
author Guy He-raud defined regions as "the ancient ethnic or submerged nations in Europe
whose right to statehood had been denied by their inclusion in 'artificial' nations
constructed around the domination of one powerful ethnic group" (Loughlin 1996,150).
He-raud also argued "Europe was a route by which these submerged nations could escape
trom the clutches of their oppressive nation-states by becoming part of a wider European
federation" (Loughlin 150-1).
Regionalism and the concept of a 'Europe of the Regions' today is more widely
accepted and not strictly an idea supported by separatist groups (for example, the German
Lander, under German federalism, are powerful regions in the EU). This concept continues
to serve the interests of stateless nations, however, because it is the n1.eans by which the
European Union transfers power and autonomy to regional governments (and, as noted
above, many stateless nations constitute a region and control local and regional governments
within the larger member state) (Loughlin 154).
According to Michael Keating, the current organizational structure of Europe is
conducive to national mobilizations because it is "complex and relatively disorganized. It
does not have a single focus of authority and does not make universal claims to allegiance
or identity. It can, therefore, be embraced by stateless nations and emerging regions as a more
neutral forum than the state, and a place where questions of sovereignty and ultimate
authority are necessarily ambiguous" (46).

https://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2007/iss1/9

Claremont-UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union

SECTION

I:

95

CURRENT TRENDS IN DEVOLUTION

EU Cohesion Policy and Structural Funds
T he first and one of the m ost impo rtant ways that sub-national acto rs gain auto no my
within the structure of the European Union is the use of structural funds (Pollack 39). As
part of the EU cohesion policy, funds are granted to specific regions within the E U in o rder
to help reduce economic disparities throu ghout the Union (Hooghe and Marks 78). In
1988 the manner in which these fimds were distributed was refo rmed and the new
regulati ons stipulated that the Conunission must work in a partnership with regio nal
autho rities in addition to state authorities in order to e nsure the effective implem.entatio n
of fundin g (H o oghe and Marks 78) . Structural funds thus give sub-national gove nU11ents
more autonomy as they are provided with a source of fundin g o utside the natio nal
gove nunent and they are empowered to work directl y w ith the sup ra national institutio n of
the E uropean C ommission without the traditional intervention of th e state. H oogh e and
Marks argue that in Belgium and Spain (bo th countries w ith sizeable stateless nations, w hich
are already quite organized and powelful) "cohesion policy feeds into pressures fo r
regio nalization and the o ngoing conflict concerning the allocation of competen cies across
levels of government" (80). Although H ooghe and Marks acknowledge that structural
fundin g has not had as significant effects for all countries as it has in countries w here
regio nalism is already well defined such as Belgium and Spain, the new cohesio n policy
regulatio ns have brought autonomy issues to light in other countries with stateless natio ns,
such as Fra nce and the United Kingdom. As a result sub-national acto rs in these countries
have increased their calls for participation at the regio nal , national and supranational levels
(81 ).
1.

2. Institutional representation for regions

Although initially E uropean integration was the sole domain of central gove rnments,
there has been a gradual increase in the representatio n of stateless nations and regio ns
institutionall y within the structure of the ED. The creation of the E uropean Parliament and
its increase in power over the years has granted stateless nations m o re representation thro ugh
the election of M embers of the Euro pean Parliam ent (ME Ps) from their regions. MEPs are
the n able to represent the interests of their stateless natio ns directly at the European level.
Currently there are M embers of the European Parliam ent representing such stateless and
minority nations as Scotland, W ales, Flanders,Vallee d'Aoste, Catalonia, the Basque Country,
Galicia, Andalusia, the Canary Islands, the Balearic Islands, Valencia, and the Russianspeaking minority in Latvia (Stateless N ations Intergro up par. 1).
Ano ther nl.Jj or breakthrough fo r regional representation occurred with the creatio n
of the Conullittee of the Regions (CoR) in 1994 (Lo ughlin155) . The CoR provides an
official European forum for regional concerns (EU par. 1). Under the Treaty of Maastricht,
the Council of Ministers and the Conunission must consult with the CoR on all region al
issues (Hooghe and M arks 78) . Additionally, the CoR m ay issue advisory opinions o n any
subj ect seen as affecting regional interests, which as Lo ughlin points o ut, are almost all public
policy issues in Europe (155). Considering that regio nal acto rs are often the o nes
implem enting European-level policy decisio ns, the opinions and suppo rt of the C oR are of
some consequence (EU par. 5). Loughlin also argues that the significance of the CoR is
evident in the fact that rather high-profile politicians have been appointed to the committee
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to represent their regional interests, su ch as the powerful Catalan President Jordi Pujol w ho
will be discussed in greater detail later in this paper (155). In his inaugural address to the
Committee of the R egio ns,Jacg ues Oelors, former President of the European Conunission,
stressed the prin ciple of subsidiarity in the European Uni o n and the integral role of the
CoR in this process of bringing the democracy and decision- making as close to the people
as possible (Loughlin 157). The CoR helps to bridge the gap between European decisionmakers and sub-national autho rities that are often responsible for implem enting the
decisions taken at the E uropean level (Hooghe and Marks 75). Although stateless nations Jre
not the only regions represented in the CoR , this body provides stateless nations with a
forum for representation on the E uropean level independent of the central state.
3. European-level Cooperation and Representation of the Regions
Ano~er way in w hich the E uropean Union has granted increased representatio n to
stateless natio ns is through cross-national regio nal cooperatio n (Loughlin 157). As part of a
supranational organization, a stateless nation is no lo nger confined to the context of dialogue
between itself and the central state, but instead can join with other stateless nations and
regio nal groups in seekin g increased representation by lobbying at the European level
(Loughlin 157). The E uropean Free Alliance for example is the political party representing
stateless nations at the E uropea n Parliament and is composed of political parties trom over
thirty-two stateless natio ns across E urope (EFA par. 3) . EFA has m ade impo rtant strides in
the European Parliam ent with regards to the protection of minority languages and human
rights violations of minority groups (EFA par. 4). In N ovember 2006, for example, the
E uropean Parliament passed a resolutio n o n a new framework strategy for multilingualism,
w hich was drafted by EFA MEP Bernat Joan i Mari . This framework strategy, among other
things, calls on the E uropean Commissio n to guarantee the respect of linguistic rights of all
citizens and encourage the availability of communication with the EU in minority as well
as offi cial EU languages (par. 21). In 2006, EFA h eld public hearings on the deportatio n of
ethnic Hungarians in Czechoslovakia and the situation of the stateless people of Latvia,
which constitute human rights violations of rnembers of minority nations (Greens-EFA par.
1) .
EFA MEPs along with members of the Stateless Natio ns Intergroup of the E uropea n
Parliament also played an active role in the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) by
lobbying fo r increased rights for stateless nations and national minorities in the draft
European Constitution (EFA 64). T he most radical demand of stateless nations was for an
'internal enlargem ent clause', w hich would " p ermit stateless nations to democratically
secede from their respective host-states while rem aining members of the European Union"
(Landau and Vanhala 9). Stateless nations also pushed for min ority rights protection
provisions in the constitution, claiming that general human rights protection often does not
incorporate issu es that are specific to stateless nations and national minorities, such as
collective cultural and linguistic rights (Landau and Vanhala 9). Although these provisions
were not accepted in the draft Constitution, du e to their conflicting nature with the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the member states, according to Landau and Vanhala,
the fact that stateless and minority nations were involved "in the drafting process itself signals
a potentially n ew system stru cturin g supranational-state-mino rity relations" (12).
Another example of European level cooperation is the Assembly of European
Regions (AER). The AER is an organization that lobbies the European Conmussion for
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regional interests and has as its goal "J grJssroots Europe where the regions Jre recognized
JS pillars of democf<lcy and key pJrtners of the European project" (AER par. 1). The AER
was instrumental in the creation of the CoR (Hooghe and Marks 87). By combining forces
and working at the E uropean level for conm10n goals of increased autonomy and
representation, stateless nations and regions are better abl e to achieve their policy goals than
by working alone at the national level.
Stateless nations and other sub-national gro ups have also gain ed increased
representation by lobbying formally and informally for their own interest at the European
level, in addition to lobbying throu gh institutional channels . M any stateless nations have
ofrlces in Brussels from w hich to lobby the European institutions, gather information, and
network (Hooghe and Marks 82). According to Hooghe and Marks, those regions that are
most "politically entrenched , most ethnically and politically distinct" are those that are most
likely to have well orgJnized lobbying offices in Brussels and thus receive the most EU
attention and funding (83). T he existence of regional offices in Brussels shows that European
integration has enabled stateless nations to represent their distinct interests at the European
level, witho ut going throu gh the traditional channels of the natio n-state.
Even within the unitary framework of states, stateless nations have gained increased
representation at the E uropean level. In the United Kingdom delegation to Brussels, for
example, Welsh and Scottish civil servants tend to h old appointments in areas of specific
concern to their regions, such as fisheries policy and regional policy (H ooghe and Marks
77). From the above examples it is evident that stateless nations have gained much
representation at the European level, w hich has led to a greater awareness of their concerns
and policy decisions favourable to regio nal interests.
4. The Idea of Europe in Sub-national Politics
As evidenced above, membership in the supranational institution of the European
Union provides stateless na tions with a new level of governance from which to receive
funding, and at which to represent and lobby for their interests; however, membership in the
European Union also grJnts stateless nations increased leverage with their respective central
goverlUllents. In Spain for example, the Catalan party COlwelgel1cia i U11i6 agreed to form
part of a coalition with the Socialist party in exchange for a greater role in EU decisionmaking (Hooghe and Marks 77). According to H oogh e and Marks, the Socialist party
"agreed to re-evaluate regional representation in all EU orgJns and to incorporate regional
representatives in decision-making on regional competencies" in exchange for COl1vcrgcl1cia
i UnicJ's suppo rt (77).
In Calalonia and the 'Idea of Europe', Giordano and Roller note that Catalan political
parties, nationalist and non-natio nalist alike, have "Europeanized their discourse", which
demonstrates a shift not o nly towards regionalism in the EU, but also a shift towards
E uropeanizatio n in the sub-national regions (99). In the past, Catalo nia sought increased
autonomy and independence by seeking the modernization and transformation of the
Spanish state; now Catalonia sees the EU and a move towards a E urope of the regions as the
most effective vehicle for ac hieving increased independence (Giordano and Roller 102).
Jo rdi Pujol, the charismatic leader of COl1vcrgcl1cia i Ul1i6, h as posited the idea of Europe "in
which member states coexist with sub-national authorities o n an equal level" (Giordano and
Roller 104). Pujol has also raised public suppo rt for Catalonia as a nation throughou t
Europe through his public and private visits abroad and his participation in international
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organizations (such as the CoR) (104).
The Scottish N ational Party (SNP), the main independence-seeking party in
Scotland, has also Europeanized its discourse over the last twenty years. In 1988 the SNP
began the " Independence w ithin E urope" campaign in order to combat criticism that
Scotland would not be economically viable as an independent state and gain support for
independence at the local level (SNP par. 5).
In lJlany stateless nations public opinion in £1VOur of the E uropean Union is high
because the people see Europe as a new level of governance that tends to be more
sympathetic to their interests (SNP par. 6). Stateless nations also argue that if the central
government is giving up sovereignty to European institutions, then stateless nations have the
right and obligation to ensure that these decisions taken at the European level are not in
conflict with their regional interests (SNP par. 6).
5. Institutional Norms, Conditionality and the Rights of Stateless Notions
In Ethnic Politics i,1 Europe, Judith Kelley studies E uropean supranational institutions
and how they allect the treatment of central governments towards stateless nations and
national lninorities (6). She finds that normative pressure and conditionality from
international institutions , and the European Union in particular, was significant in
improving the policy of the central government towards stateless nations (176). Although
conditionality of acceptance to the EU for candidate states tended to be the most important
factor in determining behaviour, Kelley also argues that nonnative pressure alone cou ld
determine compliance in the absence of other factors, such as domestic opposition and
strong nationalist influence.
In order to demonstrate specific effects that norms and conditionality have had on
state policy towards stateless and n~nority nations, Kelley provides case studies from Latvia,
Estonia , Slovakia, and Romania. In Latvia, for example, despite strong domestic opposition,
persuasion along with conditionality of EU membership was instrumental in amending a
strict language law that originally would have placed "difficult or impossible language
burdens on Russian-speakers" (Kelley 8 1). The EU pressured Latvia over a period of four
years (1995-1999) by issuing statements calling on Latvia to change the law in order to be
in accordance with international standards, engaging in correspondence with Latvian
officials, and making statements about Latvia's failure to comply in the international press
(Kelley 81). Finally the EU "made the link to EU admission clear" by stating that "Latvia's
chance of opening negotiations was good - pending passage of a favourable language law"
(Kelley 83). In December of 1999, despite fierce domestic opposition, the Latvian
government approved an amended version of the law that was acceptable to the EU and
which revoked many of the language requirements intended to discriminate against ethnic
Russians (Kelley 83) .
In another Latvian example, normative pressure from the EU combined with the
conditionality of beginning accession talks was again crucial in aniending legislation that
was discriminatory towards members of minority nations (Kelley 84). The Latvian
Citizenship Law denied citizenship to those who had arrived in Latvia after 1940 and
involved strict requirements for those wishing to become Latvian citizens: knowledge of the
Latvian language, knowledge of Latvian laws and legal structures, sixteen years residence in
Latvia , an oath of allegiance, and the renunciation of citizenship of another state (Kelley 84).
This law also stipulated an annual quota for the number of people to b e granted citizenship
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and refused citizenship to children born in Latvia to non-citizen parents (Kelley 90). The
EU issued many statements to the Latvian government that included specific changes it
wished to see in the law and eventually stated that "reform of the citizenship law was a 'key
criterion' for beginning EU entry talks" (Kelley 91). As a result, the Latvian parliament
instituted the changes required by the EU by abolishing the annual citizenship quotas and
giving citizenship to "stateless children" (Kelley 91).
As the European Union expands eastward, it incorporates an increasing number of
stateless nations wi thin new member states. For EU candidate countries the possibility of
EU m embership is enticement enough to persuade them into granting increased
representation and autonomy to stateless nations within their borders. Although Kelley
maintains that normative pressure can be significant (in the absence of domestic opposition),
she does not provide any such examples of normative pressure without associJted
conditiOiulity in her case studies, which makes the concept of normative pressure difficult
to apply to current member states without further research.

5. European Union Involvement in Self-determination Issues
In recent months, the European Parliament has addressed issues of self-determination
within current member states. In O ctober 2006, the European Parlialnent addressed the
peace talks in Spain between the Spanish government and the Basque political party
Batasuna. Mter a controversial debate, a majority in Parliament came out in support of the
peace initiative undertaken by the Spanish Prime Minister Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero
(EP par. 21). Another sovereignty issue recently discussed in a conference at the Parliament
was the reunification of Ireland and the potential benetlts and difficulties involved in this
process, drawing from the German example (EP par. 6). Although currently the European
Parliament and o ther European institutions have no right to formulate binding policy
decisions in tlus area, the fa ct that such issues are being debated in the European arena , rather
than being dismissed as an internal afFair, indicates that increasingly the EU can and will have
an impact on questions of self-determination.
II: THE EUROPEAN UNION'S FUTURE ROLE
From the above evidence, it is clear that the European Uluon is currently playing an
important role in the increased representation and autonomy of stateless nations , both for
those belonging to the EU and those desiring to join. Hooghe, Marks, Loughlin, and
Keating all argue that this trend towards devolution will continue and although regionalism
will never (and in the interests of stateless nations should never) become uniform across
European regions, the questions remain as to wha t progress for autonomy-seeking nations
is desirable. Many of Europe's stateless nations and governance scholars are predicting and
calling for reform within the EU institutions to grant these groups more equality and
representation in Europe. Landau and Vanhala state that the demands of stateless nations can
be divided into two categories, with recoglution, access, and participation comprising
constitution-'!ffirming demands whiie separation, autonomy, and independence comprise
constitution-challenging demands (4). They go on to argue that stateless and nunority nations
will often begin with constitutions-affirnung demands, but will change from constitutionaffirnung to constitution-challenging demands if the former are not adequately met
(Landau and Vanhala 5). Additionally, with the increasing acceptance of Eastern European
countries, many of whom have sizeable stateless nation populations witlun their borders
SECTION
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(such as the Roma in Romania, the Macedonian minority in Bulgaria, etc.) and a poo r track
record for minority rights and recognition, it is evident that increasingly the European
institutions will have to deal with mino rity issues. The following section of this paper will
address some possible reforms .
A More Representative Official Languages Policy
One issu e that is a major source of contention among stateless nations within the
E uropean Union is the offIcial EU languages policy. Under the current policy, each state can
choose which languages it wishes to be official EU languages (generally the official
language(s) of the state). H ere as in other instances is exposed the unrepresentative nature of
the state-centred EU ; citizens of sm all states such as Malta w ith just 400,000 people are able
to interact with the Europea n institutions in their native language of Maltese, yet
Catalo nians, with 7 millio n speakers must speak Castilian Spanish o r another language not
their native tongue at the E uropean institutions. T his poli cy is ineffi cient at best, as the costs
for recruiting and training translators for some of the less w idely spoken languages are
exorbitant, and at worst is unrepresentative of the linguistic diversity and heritage of m any
Europeans.
As mentioned above, the European Parliament ado pted a fram ework strategy for
multilingualism drafted by EFA MEP Bernat Joan i M ari . Altho ugh the strategy was
adopted, many of Joan i M ari's m ain points regarding minority languages were diluted or
deleted completely. A possible reason for this is that the report demanded more funding and
programs for translatio n and learning of all minority languages. With approximately sixty
non-official indigenous languages in the EU area, increased funding for all minority
languages becomes an exp ensive and impossible task . By ad voca ting increased funding and
progranUlles for widely spoken non-official languages, h owever, Joan i Mari would have seen
m o re of his regional and minority language policy recommendatio ns passed , and would
bring increased publicity to the lack of representation of stateless nations at the EU.
Spain has made some efforts to democratize its languages at the European institutions
by paying interpretation costs fo r minority language sp eakers of Catalan, Basque, and
Galician upon request (EP par. 3). There still remains much to be done in this area, however,
as in the everyday functioning of the EU, even Catalan M EPs and Commissioners are not
able to function in their native to ngue, as do so many of their counterparts. It is also
important to note that Spain is the most progressive state in the EU with regards to minority
languages policy. Other stateless natio ns lack the few oppo rtunities to use their native
tongue at the EU institutions that has been granted to minority language speakers in Spain.
In the European Parliament Rules of Procedure, it states that all members have the
right to follow debates and express themselves in their native languages (EP par. 1).Although
it is evident that providing interpretation into every EU language (official or non-official)
would be impossible in terms of both logistics and cost, the European Parliament should be
accessible to native speakers of widely used minority languages. An example of how this
could b e done would be to examine the number of MEPs with a minority language as their
native tongue as well as the number of constituents overall in the E uropean Union with the
same native language. When in thes.e circumstances, minority languages are equally or more
widely- used than the ten m ost conunonly used official langu ages in the EU, then provisions
sho uld be made by the E U for the interpretation of these languages upon request of
participating MEPs. Altho ugh interpretation is costly, all in the European Parliament affirm
1.
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that multilingualism is an essential aspect of the European institutions, and currently
interpretation costs constitute just 1% of the E U budget (EU par. 3). By refo rming
interpretation procedures in other areas, su ch as reducing stand-by o rders for interpreters,
which leads to paying fo r services supplied but not used, the E uropean Parliament will have
increased interpretation funds available to support the use of regional and min ority
languages in the EU (EU par. 5).

of the Regions
In order to ensure proper rep resentation of stateless nations and regio ns, there have
also been calls to increase the powe r of the Committee of the Regions. T he CoR, as
discussed above, is m ore representative of the people and nations of E urope, as
representatives from different regions are assigned based upo n the population of each state
(CoR par. 4). Despite the m ore representative nature of the CoR, its power is largely
symbolic and it plays a strictl y consultative role (H ooghe and Marks 78). Som e stateless
nations and their representatives, such as EFA, have proposed that the European Parliament
be transformed into a bi- cam erJI legislature, in which the citizens are represented in o ne
chamber and the nations (including stateless and minoriry natio ns) and the regions
represented in the other (EFA par. 5) . In a CoR report written fo r the European
COl1unission , Catalan President Jordi Puj ol called fo r the CoR to have the status of a
European Institutio n, like the Parliament, C om.mission , Council, and European Court of
Justice, which would give it m o re than simply consultative powers on issues of regio nal
concern (Loughlin 156). These changes would increase the autonom.y and representation of
stateless natio ns within the European institutions.
2. An Increased Role for the Committee

3 .. Judicial Representation for Stateless Nations
A fin al call for increasing the representatio n of stateless natio ns is the inclusio n of
minoriry rights in E uropean Human Rights policy. This includes granting territorial entities
(i.e. stateless nations) within Europe the right to access the European Court ofJustice (ECJ),
which currently settles legJI disputes b etween EU m ember states, EU institutio ns,
businesses, and individuals, but not regio nal or sub- natio nal governments (ECJ par. 5). In the
Sal1l.e report mentio ned above, Pujol recommended that the CoR have " the right to bring
infringements of the principle of subsidiariry to the European C o urt of Justice" (Loughlin
156). Allowing stateless nations o r regional govenunents to bring such cases befo re the ECJ
would ensure greater protectio n of the rights of these regio ns under European law and
would ensure increased compliance of member states to principles of subsidiarity.
Keating suggests that the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) also has a more
important role to play in the promotion of self-determination. He states "a European-wide
rights regime is emerging that, for the first time, effe ctively separates rights from national
citizenship" (86). As Keating states, the EU is more than a conU110n market, and the
European Court of Human Rights shows that E urope is prepared to embrace C0I1U110n
values (86). Many states within the European Union have members of stateless natio ns
within their borders who are denied citizenship and whose language rights and voting rights
among others are repressed. This is evidenced in the above example of Latvia (which,
although has made some progress, still has far to go in terms of equal treatment of minority
nations) (Kelley 87). Ano ther example is that of the 'erased people' of Slovenia who are
migrants from other former Yugoslav republics who were living in Slovenia but had not

Self-determination and independence movements in Europe

102

JEANNINE PLAMONDON

Brigham Young University

obtained Slovenian citizenship at the time of independence. The names of these people were
effectivel y erased off of the public registry (Amnesty Internatio nal par. 5). Increased use of
the European C ourt of Human Rights for complaints against such violatio ns would ensure
g reater protection of the human rights of stateless and min ority natio ns as individuals and
as a g roup. In discussing the inclusion of minority rights in the draft European Constitutio n,
Hungarian Foreign M inister Lazlo Kovacs said, "If. . . the protection of minority rights will
no t be included in the E U constitution ... it would indicate that something has changed,
that these [constitutional] documents are no longer valid, or that they are not equall y valid
fo r everyone" (Landau and Vanhala 11). The same principle can be applied to minority rights
at the ECHR, if the EC HR does no t address mino rity rights, then it is no longer valid as
an institution upholding the human rights of all Europeans.
CONCLUSION

T he European Union is a unique institution that consolidates power to the
sup ra national level on the o ne hand and devolves power towards sub-national governments
and regions on the other. T his shift in the traditional power structure away from the central
state is a great benefit to stateless nations in Europe who gain increased representation by
ac ting at the European level and also gain increased autonomy by looking outside the
central state to receive fundin g and decision-making powers from the European institutio ns.
O ne issue relevant to tllis paper that could be examined further is the specific norm ative
role that the E uropean Union does and can play in issues of sub- national auto nomy, and
particularl y how the effects of normative pressure or even the use of normative pressure
change over time. The devolution of power to sub-state acto rs is not uniform, but it is
arguably permanent and will continue to progress as European integration goes w ider and
deep er. It is already clea r that th e European Union is playing an increased role in
determilling the £lte of stateless natio ns within and w ithout its m ember states. This process
leads to the necessity for increased representatio n of stateless nations in the European
institutions. Although m any of these changes in Europe were not foreseen when integration
first began, they are beneficial not o nly to stateless nations and nlino rities, but to E urope in
general as it builds a mo re representative society - a 'Euro pe of the R egions' and a 'Euro pe
of the Peo ples'.
END NOTES

1. According to the Stateless N ations Intergroup of the Euro pean Parliament, stateless
natio ns are " internal natio ns of ' union states', that is states constituted by historical unio ns
of previously independent and self-governing parts. M ost such internal nations, or 'stateless
natio ns' aspire to, and many have acllieved the status of constitutionally self-governing
countries within their respective m ember states . .. N evertheless, in the perspective of the
state's constitution, the powers of these internal nations are legally subordinate powers" (pa r.
3). Some pronlinent examples include Catalonia and the Basque Country in Spain, Scotland
and Wales in the United Kingdom , etc. For the purposes of this paper, this definitio n also
includes national nlino rities, which. are " nlinority groups living o utside the state with w llich
they identity historically, culturally or linguistically" such as ethllic Russians in the Baltic
States, the Macedonian nlinority in Bulgaria, etc. (Landau and Vanhala 2).
2 . For the purposes of this paper I am not referring to diverse imnligrant
communities, but rather to established COllli11l1nities of natio nalities indigenous to Europ e,
as defined above.
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